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Abstract
This paper examines the possibility of the demographic dividend in Nigeria. It investigates the role of youth 
empowerment in the attainment of the demographic dividend. It identifies the challenges facing a typical 
Nigerian youth and the various ways of investing in the youth bulge. It finds that the challenges facing the 
Nigerian youth ranges from the problem of youth unemployment, limited access to educational and lack of 
economic opportunities, lack of access to basic education, high HIV prevalence rate to high poverty rate. It 
posits that contrary to expectations, increase in the population of the youth may undermine development if 
the challenges facing the youths are not addressed. The paper recommends that the government should cre-
ate employment and economic opportunities, provide educational and health facilities, and combat poverty 
in order to ensure that the bulging youth population translates into economic growth and development.
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Résumé
Ce document examine la possibilité de le dividende démographique au Nigeria. Il étudie le rôle de l'autono-
misation des jeunes dans la réalisation du dividende démographique. Il identifie les défis auxquels fait face un 
jeune Nigérian typique et les différentes façons d'investir dans l'explosion de la jeunesse. Il estime que les 
défis auxquels sont confrontés les plages de jeunes nigérians du problème de chômage des jeunes, l'accès 
limité à l'éducation et le manque d'opportunités économiques, le manque d'accès à l'éducation de base, le 
taux de prévalence du VIH est élevée au taux de pauvreté élevé. Il postule que, contrairement aux attentes, 
l'augmentation de la population de la jeunesse peut compromettre le développement si les défis auxquels 
font face les jeunes ne sont pas abordées. Le document recommande que le gouvernement devrait créer des 
emplois et de possibilités économiques, aux possibilités d'enseignement et de santé et de lutte contre la pau-
vreté afin de s'assurer que la population des jeunes bombé se traduit par la croissance économique et le 
développement.
Mots-clés: jeunesse Ardennes, l'empowerment des jeunes, dividende démographique, le développement 
économique, le Nigeria
1.0 Introduction
Economists have foreseen that Nigeria is expected 
to experience a youth bulge - an increase in the pop-
ulation of the youth relative to other age groups 
(Bloom and Humair, 2010; Reed and Mberu, 2011). 
The general expectation was that rising ratio of 
youth population relative to other age groups would 
stimulate economic growth and development, oth-
erwise known as demographic dividend. The youth 
bulge has the potential to propel economic growth 
and human development. However, this is not auto-
matic (Olaniyan, Soyibo and Lawanson, 2012). For 
example, the high rate of risky behavior associated 
with the youth population has led many to conclude 
that the youth bulge could be a problem rather than 
an asset to the society (Skogan, 1986; Urdal, 2006).
In recent years, various governments have 
devised new approaches to addressing the chal-
lenges facing the youth as well as harnessing their 
potential. This has led to the recognition of the need 
to empower the youth in order to realize the bene-
fits of the demographic dividend. Against this back-
drop, the major questions this paper answers are: 
What are the major challenges facing the Nigerian 
youth today? What role does youth empowerment 
play in realizing demographic dividend? How has the 
government of other countries, particularly in the 
South-East Asia, empowered and invested in their 
youth? How can the Nigerian government invest in 
the youth bulge?
The main objective of this paper is to theoreti-
cally examine the role of youth empowerment in the 
attainment of the demographic dividend. Specifically, 
it identifies the challenges facing the youth, investi-
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gate how countries in South-East Asia invested in 
their youth bulge and how government can invest in 
the youth bulge to enhance the attainment of demo-
graphic dividend in Nigeria.
The paper is divided into four sections. The first 
section is the introduction. The second section is the 
literature review and theoretical framework, 
which presents an overview of youth bulge and 
demographic dividend and their underlying 
mechanisms. Discussion of key issues is the 
focus on section three. In it, we examine the 
challenges facing the youth in Nigeria, the potential 
benefits and consequences of the youth bulge, and 
experiences of other countries in managing their 
youth bulge. The final section provides the conclu-
sion and recommendation.
2.0 Literature review and theoretical 
framework
2.1 Youth bulge and demographical dividend: 
an overview
The term “youth bulge” was coined by a German 
social scientist, Gunnar Heinsohn in the mid-1990s. 
It is a common phenomenon in many developing 
countries. It is used to describe a situation where 
there is an increase in the proportion of the youth 
population relative to other age groups. A country is 
said to incur a youth bulge when the population of 
the youth group is larger than all other age groups, 
which is attributed to an increased birth rate, declin-
ing infant mortality and overall improvement in 
health. 
There is evidence that the youth bulge is valid in 
sub-Saharan Africa, as the region’s youth population 
has been increasing far more than it is experienced 
in other regions of the world. This is supported by 
the World Bank, which claimed that over 200 million 
people, representing about 20% of the population, 
40% of the work force, and 60% of the unemployed 
in Africa, falls within the youthful population (Agbor, 
Taiwo and Smith, 2012). This means that more and 
more youth are not absorbed into the economy.
Statistics from the Population Bureau confirms 
the problem of the youth bulge in Africa. Fig. 1 
shows that as at 2010, the proportion of the young 
population in Africa is higher than in developed and 
several developing countries. As at 2010, the pro-
portion of child population (0-14) and youth popula-
tion (15-29) in the total population in the developed 
region stood at 15% and 20% respectively. In the 
developing regions, the proportion of child and 
youth population was 29% and 27% in 2010. In the 
case of Africa, child and youth population accounts 
for 40% and 28% respectively. In effect, the propor-
tion of the young population in Africa’s total popula-
tion is about 70%. Similarly, the youthful population 
as a percentage of projected population in the 15-29 
age range shows that by 2050 Africa will have the 
highest share of young people in the world (Fig.2).
The demographic dividend on the other hand, is 
the socio-economic opportunity that emerges in a 
country as fertility rates decline which can lead to 
economic growth and development when supported 
with appropriate and effective public policies. It 
occurs when a falling birth rate changes the age dis-
tribution, so that fewer resources are required to 
meet the needs of the dependent population of chil-
dren and old people and resources are mobilized for 
investment in economic growth and human develop-
ment. 
The concept of demographic dividend is borne 
out of the notion that as mortality rates reduces, 
people would desire to have fewer children, and 
there would be an increase in the population of 
working adults relative to the other population 
groups, which would result in economic growth. 
The increase in the number of the working-age 
adults lays the foundation for demographic dividend. 
The reduction in the number of children allows fam-
ilies to invest more in their children’s education and 
health, increasing skills and human capital. Besides, 
working adults have the opportunity to save more 
for retirement as dependency ratio reduces. Women 
could also work as the time used for child rearing is 
reduced, thereby boosting the labour force. These 
developments are expected to have positive effects 
on the economy; although a new study by Bloom et 
al. (2009) shows that lower fertility can also lead to 
higher inequality in the short term.
There is an obvious relationship between fertility 
rate and development. Families with large number of 
children tend to be poorer and vice-versa (NBS, 
2006). Similarly, countries with high fertility rates 
often tend to be poorer. For instance, countries with 
the highest fertility rates such as Mali, Niger and 
Chad are among the poorest in the world. Also, 
countries with low fertility rates tend to be rich. 
Using Demographic and Health Survey data for 60 
countries, Bloom et al. (2009) found that the youth 
dependency ratio is lowest in the richest countries, 
next lowest in the next richest countries, and so on 
to the poorest countries, which has the highest 
youth dependency ratio. Also, demographic dividend 
has been argued to account for between 25 and 
40% of the economic transformation experienced 
by the East Asian Tigers (Bloom, Canning and 
Malaney, 2000; Bloom and Williamson, 1998). On 
the other hand, Bloom and Sachs (1998) posited that 
population explosion has contributed to economic 
stagnation in most of sub-Saharan African countries. 
A recent study by Ashraf, Weil and Wilde (2011) 
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shows that a decrease in Nigeria’s fertility rate by 
one child per woman would boost GDP per head by 
13% over 20 years, due largely to the dependency 
effect. In the next section, the core challenges facing 
the youth population are discussed.

Fig. 1 Proportion of young population as % of total population, 2010 
 

Fig. 2: Youthful population as % of projected population in the 15-29 age range, 
Country Aggregates 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UN, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011), World Population Prospects: The 
2010 Revision. Medium fertility scenario is used for the 2050 projections. 
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3.0 Discussion
3.1 Challenges facing the youth in Nigeria
3.1.1Socio-economic and political environment
The socio-economic and political environment in 
Nigeria poses a great challenge to the youth. Key 
economic and social indicators point to the fragility 
of the Nigerian economy and poor well being of the 
people. After over fifty years of independence, the 
economy is still dependent on the primary sector. 
There is high level of indebtedness, unemployment, 
poverty, infant and maternal mortality, illiteracy, and 
an entrenched culture of corruption. The absence of 
basic infrastructure has left majority of Nigerians 
with no access to basic services such as water sup-
ply, electricity, sanitation, housing, among other 
important basic means of survival. The situation has 
been worsened by the poor governance structures 
in place in the country (Aiyede, 2002). Thus, after 
over ten years of democratic rule, the political land-
scape is still marked by exclusion of most people 
from governance, lack of accountability and trans-
parency, and corruption, all of which have implica-
tion for the meaningful participation of the youth 
population in the economic and governance arrange-
ments of the country.
3.1.2  Poverty
The poverty level in Nigeria has witnessed a sub-
stantial upward swing over time given statistics 
report in the NBS 2006 Report. As at 1980, poverty 
level in Nigeria was 28.1%. The poverty level 
increased to 46.3% in 1985, before plunging to 
42.7% in 1992. In 1996, the poverty rate increased 
drastically to 66.9%. However, due to the various 
poverty-alleviating measures initiated by the govern-
ment at the beginning of the new democratic dispen-
sation, the national poverty rate fell by 12.5%. 
However, between 2004 and 2010, the poverty level 
rose by 14.6%. Similarly, the proportion of the pop-
ulation living in poverty has consistently increased 
from 1980 to 2010. In 1980, 18% of the population 
was reported as living in poverty, but the rate dou-
bled in 1985. Between 1985 and 2004, the popula-
tion under poverty doubled, increasing from 35% in 
2004 to 69% in 2004. The trend is worsened by the 
increasing rate of unemployment, lack of basic infra-
structure, political corruption, and poor economic 
policies. The prevailing situation has forced many 
Nigerian youths into social vices such as drug traf-
ficking, kidnapping, fraud, prostitution, crime, and 
other illegitimate activities.
3.1.3  Unemployment
In addition to the numerous challenges which 
include high level of poverty, terrorism and militancy, 
and corruption which face Nigeria, youth unemploy-
ment remains a challenge to the policy makers and 
the political leadership. Youth unemployment has 
been described as a major problem and a denomina-
tor of most of the other problems faced by the 
country. According to the National Bureau of Statis-
tics (NBS), the national unemployment rate in 
Nigeria in 2005 was 11.90%. This rose sharply to 
19.7% in 2008; and in 2010 and 2011, the figures 
were 21.1% and 23.9%, respectively.
Although, youth unemployment has long been a 
problem in Nigeria, it assumed a higher dimension 
during and after the global economic meltdown. The 
lingering financial crisis coupled with the poor per-
formance of the manufacturing sector due in part, to 
poor infrastructure, exacerbated the situation. The 
neglect of the agricultural sector, rural-urban migra-
tion, poor business environment and the moribund 
state of the industrial sector have also contributed 
immensely to the problem. 
A more worrisome trend in the unemployment 
situation in Nigeria is the high rate of graduate 
unemployment in recent years. Okafor (2011) stated 
that about 64 million youths were unemployed or 
underemployed in the country, while noting that in 
2008, only 10% of Nigerian graduates got paid 
employment in the country. According to another 
study, graduate unemployment increased from 
25.6% in 2003 to 40.3% in 2009 (Akinyemi, Ofem 
and Ikuenomore, 2012).
3.1.4  Lack of educational opportunities
Education and human capital development are vital 
to economic growth and poverty reduction. Besides, 
they are critical to the realization of demographic 
dividend because they easily translate to economic 
growth and development. However, educational 
opportunities in Nigeria are unequally distributed. 
Poor youths have less educational opportunities than 
their richer counterparts. Similarly, some socio-eco-
nomic and cultural factors favour boys ahead of girls 
in primary and secondary school enrollment, espe-
cially in the northern part of the country while eco-
nomic hardship often force them out of school in 
other parts of the country. 
According to the NBS (2009), 34% and 20% of 
adult and youth respectively could not read or write 
in 2008. In the same year, Imo State has the highest 
youth literacy rates at 99.2%, followed by Lagos 
State at 99%; while Lagos State has the highest adult 
literacy rate at 95%. On the other hand, Bauchi 
State has the lowest youth literacy rate at 48.9% 
while Katsina State has the lowest adult literacy rate 
at 29.6%. Only 3,720,789 children, representing 
37.9% of primary school enrolment, have access to 
junior secondary school education in Nigeria in 
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2008. The South West reported the highest figure of 
24.4% while the South South recorded the lowest, 
11.5%. Moreso, only very few proportion of sec-
ondary school leavers gain admission to higher insti-
tutions due to small number of tertiary institutions 
relative to the population of applicants. In all, fiscal 
crises, political instability, endemic poverty and high 
demographic pressure on the educational system 
have resulted in falling quality and limited access to 
education (Odaga and Heeveld, 1995). Further-
more, the available educational infrastructure is inad-
equate to provide access to a functional and 
qualitative education for all Nigerian children and 
youths. Qualified Nigerian youths have also been 
denied access to quality education due to “equity-
driven” government policies such as “catchment 
areas” and “educationally less advantaged states”.
The government has recently taken steps to 
increase the quality and access to education for the 
youth. The first is the introduction of the almajiri 
school system in Northern Nigeria to keep youths in 
the region off the street and provide them with qual-
ity education. Second, the Federal Government has 
established nine new federal universities to expand 
available spaces for qualified Nigerian youth to 
access university education. In addition, there are 
steps to ensure adequate funding and upgrade of the 
entire tertiary educational system with the main aim 
of expanding access to qualitative educational oppor-
tunities. However, despite efforts by the govern-
ment to revamp the education sector and improve 
educational opportunities for the youth, there are 
still challenges that impede access to qualitative and 
effective education. These challenges include inade-
quate funding, corruption, poverty, incessant strike 
actions by university teachers, poor infrastructure 
and government policies.
3.1.5  HIV/AIDS and reproductive health risks
Young people the world over face serious reproduc-
tive health risks and health problems associated with 
inadequate healthcare services, illiteracy and pov-
erty. The lack of sexual health services and education 
places the youth at a high risk of unwanted preg-
nancy, abortion and sexually transmitted diseases 
including HIV/AIDS. Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS prevalence 
rate ranges from 10.6% in Benue State to 1.0% in 
Ekiti State, while the aggregate prevalence rate 
stands at 4.6% in 2008 (NBS, 2009). This is relatively 
small in comparison to some Southern African 
nations. However, the country accounts for about 
one-tenth of the world’s HIV/AIDS infected persons 
with 3.5 million infected people, the largest HIV-pos-
itive population in Africa after South Africa (UNAIDS 
2001, cited in Dagne, 2006). As the population 
increases, HIV infection rate will likely increase, 
especially among youths, if urgent steps are not 
taken to arrest the drift. The lack of educational and 
economic opportunities for the youth as well as the 
high level of poverty may aggravate the problem of 
HIV/AIDS in Nigeria.
Apart from these identified problems, an average 
youth in Nigeria is faced with challenges of inade-
quate parental care, moral decadence, religious 
fanaticism, cultism, examinational practices, indisci-
pline, breakdown of family and cultural values, over-
exposure to negative western cultures, over-expo-
sure to the culture of corruption, ethnicity and lack 
of national consciousness, abuse of technology and 
political manipulation of youths (Aiyede, 2002; Ovi-
awe, 2010).
3.2 Youth bulge, empowerment and 
demographic dividend
Leveraging the youth bulge productively and effec-
tively could lead to prolonged economic growth and 
substantial poverty reduction. The youth bulge 
presents great potentials for economic opportunities 
for Nigeria through active participation in the labour 
market and expansion of markets. It could also be a 
source of savings. The youth population can also 
engender innovation and support governance and 
political reforms (Agbor, Taiwo and Smith, 2012). If 
the increase in the number of the working popula-
tion can be fully absorbed into productive activities, 
ceteris paribus, average per capita disposable 
income will increase. Thus, the youth bulge will 
result in a demographic dividend. Increased number 
of employed youths also offers great opportunities 
for skills transfer, which directly impact human capi-
tal accumulation and long term economic growth 
and development. Also, a youthful and employed 
population will directly contribute to reduction in 
inequality, thereby enhancing the prospects for social 
coherence and stability, which are key ingredients 
for growth and development (Zille and Benjamin, 
2011). However, if there are no economic opportu-
nities for the large number of the youth population, 
the youth bulge could result in a demographic bomb, 
because a large number of jobless youth could 
become a potential source of social and political 
instability, with dire consequences for economic 
development.
The effect of demographic dividend on eco-
nomic growth is transmitted through increases in 
labour supply, savings rates, human capital and 
domestic demand. It is centered on the assumption 
that increase in population of the working group rel-
ative to other age group will result in increase in 
labour supply, savings, investment, human capital 
development, domestic demand and ultimately eco-
nomic growth. This is because there will be reduc-
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tion in dependency ratio as families spend less on 
children’s education, health and other needs, 
thereby creating opportunities for savings and 
investment. However, the manifestation of the 
demographic dividend depends on effective and 
appropriate complementary public policies.
To enjoy the benefit of the demographic divi-
dend, the government needs to put in place appro-
priate policies. Most importantly, they need to invest 
in youth empowerment and development. Increase 
in the population of the working class without ade-
quate provision for their absorption into the labour 
force may not result in economic growth. The possi-
bility of the demographic dividend resulting in eco-
nomic growth and human development is 
dependent on the initiation and sustenance of effec-
tive complementary public policies, especially those 
relating to youth empowerment.
Improving access to health facilities is crucial to 
the effective translation of the demographic dividend 
to economic growth and human development. Evi-
dences abound that improved health facilitates pro-
ductivity (Bloom, Canning and Malaney, 2000). An 
increase in youth population relative to other age 
groups may not result into productivity if the youth 
are affected by poor health. It points to the impor-
tance of appropriate health policies to ensure 
improved productivity in the course of the demo-
graphic dividend. Family planning services aimed at 
reducing unwanted pregnancies could facilitate the 
development impact of the demographic dividend.
Policies aimed at reducing the level of poverty 
and youth unemployment are also vital to the attain-
ment of the benefits of the demographic dividend. 
According to Olaleye (2010), youth empowerment 
helps to reduce the level of poverty and the tenden-
cies for young people to engage in criminal activities. 
Initiatives to improve human resource capabilities 
and create jobs are essential to absorb the large 
number of youths entering the labour force. This 
could be achieved by creating an enabling environ-
ment for the private sector through appropriate 
investment in infrastructure and initiation of good 
macroeconomic policies. Besides, developing a cul-
ture of entrepreneurship among the youth can help 
to reduce the level of unemployment and poverty in 
the country.
According to Obadan and Odusola (2001), the 
possibility of Nigeria promoting inclusive develop-
ment and improving the welfare of the people is 
bleak if efforts are not put in place to stem the tide 
of youth unemployment. Besides, education and 
human capital development have long been recog-
nized as pivotal to economic development and pov-
erty alleviation. However, in a country such as 
Nigeria where high levels of youth and graduate 
unemployment exist, the attainment of development 
objectives may well be considered an illusion. This is 
because education and human capital are not trans-
lated into productivity, leaving demographic dividend 
to be of no effect. The implications of these are high 
level of poverty, crime rate, drug trafficking, hostage 
taking, youth restiveness, terrorism and other social 
vices. This problem could also be a clog in Nigeria’s 
wheel to actualizing the objectives of the transfor-
mation agenda, the MDGs and Vision 20: 2020.
Moreover, to ensure that demographic dividend 
is sustainable, good public policies that would pro-
mote the effective transmission of the demographic 
dividend into economic growth must be initiated, 
even though they take time to establish and take 
effect (Ross, 2004). Therefore, investments in edu-
cation, health, and job creation are vital. This is in 
line with Ruhl (2011) who argue that in order to 
empower Nigerian youth and make the current 
youth bulge beneficial, they should be engaged 
through the ICT, entertainment, hospitality and agri-
business sector.
The youth bulge could also be associated with 
violence and conflict. Following the youth explosion 
that has been widely characterized as the Arab 
Spring of 2011, security experts have considered 
sub-Saharan Africa region the next stop for political 
up-risings. This is as a result of the increase in the 
population of educated youths confronted with ris-
ing unemployment and lack of economic opportuni-
ties (AfDB, 2012 and Ogujiuba, Ogbonnaya and 
Abraham, 2013). Unemployment, poverty, and 
recently, rising prices present a serious challenge to 
the youth in the region. It is believed that a surplus of 
young people, especially men, who cannot find 
opportunities in the society, may be forced to 
embark on violence. Even in the absence of large-
scale political revolts like those of the Arab Spring, 
mass youth unemployment could result in lost 
human capital and increased crime and other social 
vices. This school of thought has been buttressed by 
experiences of some West African countries such as 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire 
(Atta-Asamoah and Kwesi-Aning, 2011). The spate 
of terrorist activities and kidnapping in the Northern 
and Southern parts of Nigeria respectively has also 
led credence to the arguement of this school of 
thought. Therefore, the youth bulge in Nigeria is a 
frightening challenge to the country’s development, 
and thus requires careful and swift interventions. 
The government must engender efforts to harness 
the opportunities in the youth bulge and minimize its 
risks.
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3.3 Confronting Nigeria’s youth bulge: 
experiences and policy options
The experience of the East Asian Tigers provides a 
model in the management of the youth bulge. The 
youth bulge experienced by these countries 
between 1965 and 1990 was effectively managed 
through better education and increased job oppor-
tunities, leading to impressive economic growth and 
development. Some policy analysts have attributed 
over 40% of the phenomenal growth experienced 
by these countries to the positive effect of the youth 
bulge, alongside radical trade policies and human 
capital development (Bloom and Canning, 2006).
Some countries in East Asia have been successful 
in converting their youth bulge into demographic 
dividend. Dependency ratio has declined significantly 
in South Korea in the past 40 years. The country has 
also kept youth unemployment below 12% and in 
single-digit in recent years. This has been followed 
by a dramatic increase in GDP growth and average 
wages (Lin, 2012). Similarly, due to versatile eco-
nomic reforms since the late 1970s, China has been 
able to generate million of new jobs while also relo-
cating young workers from lower productivity agri-
cultural activities to higher productivity manufac-
turing.
Cambodia has the highest proportion of young 
people in South-East Asia. In her case, it was discov-
ered that the challenges facing the youth are linked 
to access to education, skill training and health care. 
Most school leavers are ill-equipped to enter the 
labour market. There are also concerns in the areas 
of reproductive health and STIs including HIV. To 
address this challenge, the key stakeholders, involv-
ing the government, civil society, and youth organisa-
tions were engaged in the development of the 
National Policy on Youth Development. The policy is 
a cross-sectoral approach, taking cognizance of the 
various needs of the youth. Similarly, countries in the 
Pacific region focused extensively on multi-sectoral 
approach, with emphasis on skills training, volun-
teerism and the development of sustainable liveli-
hoods. Attention is placed particularly on integrating 
youth into the traditional sector of agriculture and 
entrepreneurship. Also, the strategy recommends 
that young entrepreneur are given incentives and 
supports, including bank loan schemes, business 
small grant schemes, tax breaks, and establishment 
of technical advisory and support units (Asia-Pacific 
Interagency Group, 2011).
To curtail the possibility of the youth-led Arab 
Spring in sub-Saharan Africa, the sub-region’s gov-
ernments at the 2011 African Union Summit, in 
Equatorial Guinea, reached a consensus to acceler-
ate the 2009-2018 Decade of Youth Action Plan. 
They noted that given the high level of unemploy-
ment in the region, the youth bulge was an impend-
ing threat to stability (ILO, 2012).
Several youth-oriented goals have however been 
set in order to avert this impending disaster. The AU 
aims to reduce youth unemployment by 2% per 
year over the next five years as contained in the 
Plan; focus on vocational and technical education and 
training; and to provide adequate funding to advance 
the youth agenda (Africa Union, 2011). These deci-
sion and goals may not be realistic if appropriate and 
pragmatic actions are not taken at the national lev-
els.
There is need for governments in the sub-region 
to begin to develop strategies to upgrade the skills 
and competencies of the youth in line with the each 
country’s comparative advantage and sectoral pros-
pects. For example, the Kenyan Government in its 
Vision 2030 has prioritised information technology 
(IT) enabled services, as a strategy for reducing 
youth unemployment and enhancing economic 
growth. The initiative is expected to provide over 
10,000 jobs in five years (Government of Kenya, 
2007). Therefore, policy makers in the region must 
identify sectors with potentials for job creation and 
develop the skills of the youth around such sectors.
Available evidence suggests that majority of the 
youth in sub-Saharan Africa are involved in self-
employment in the informal and agricultural sectors. 
According to Adams (2008), 94% of the general 
population in Mali, 74% in Ethiopia and 31% in 
South Africa are engaged in the informal and agricul-
tural sector. Unfortunately, the governments in the 
region have not paid particular attention and given 
priority to agriculture and development of the infor-
mal sector. To successfully manage the youth bulge 
to enhance socio-economic development in sub-
Saharan Africa, governments in the region should 
create an enabling environment for youth to partici-
pate in the labour market. They should focus on pro-
moting conditions that are favourable to the 
development of the agricultural and informal sec-
tors. These sectors possess enormous potential for 
youth employment and wealth creation, and typically 
require low formal skills. Besides, the problem of 
shortage of infrastructural facilities, particularly 
power supply that could aid small and medium-scale 
enterprises should be appropriately and adequately 
addressed. Policy makers should also facilitate means 
to ensure that young entrepreneurs have access to 
credit. This can be done by providing incentives for 
financial institutions to provide funds to self-
employed youths.
Institutional factors that serve as barriers to 
youth integration into the economy should be 
removed. In most sub-Saharan countries, youth and 
women have restricted access to land due to land 
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use rights and laws, thereby limiting their productive 
prospects in the agricultural sector. Similarly, in 
Nigeria, institution such as the National Youth Serv-
ice Corp (NYSC) and the principle of federal charac-
ter have disguisedly fuel the problem of graduate 
unemployment as private companies take advantage 
of the scheme to employ youth corp members on 
continuous basis instead of employing substantive 
staffs.
4.0 Conclusion and recommendations
Half of Nigeria’s population is youthful. Addressing 
the critical challenges facing them is an urgent prior-
ity if social and economic development efforts are to 
succeed. Every country is expected to benefit from 
increase in the population of the working group rela-
tive to other age groups. Nigeria and some other 
sub-Saharan African countries are starting the demo-
graphic transition and are expected to witness a sig-
nificant rise in the population of young adults and the 
economic benefits associated with it.
The paper has argued that the challenges facing 
the Nigerian youth range from the problem of youth 
unemployment, lack of economic opportunities, lack 
of access to basic education, high HIV prevalence 
rate to high poverty rate. It also found that contrary 
to expectations, increase in the population of the 
youth may undermine development if the challenges 
facing the youths are not addressed. This paper rec-
ommends that the government should formulate and 
sustain policies that would address the socio-eco-
nomic challenges facing the youth. Investments that 
meet young people’s needs for health care, educa-
tion and economic opportunities are essential. Cre-
ating employment and economic opportunities, 
providing health and educational facilities and com-
bating poverty are critical elements of ensuring that 
the bulging youth population translates into eco-
nomic growth and development.
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